Pneumococcal vaccine reduces antibiotic-resistant infections in children by 62 percent

The pneumococcal vaccine recommended for young children not only prevents illness and death, but also has dramatically reduced severe antibiotic-resistant infections, suggests nationwide research being presented at IDWeek 2014™. Pneumococcal infection -- which can cause everything from ear infections to pneumonia and meningitis -- is the most common vaccine-preventable bacterial cause of death.

The 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13), first available in 2010 (replacing 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, PCV7), reduced the incidence of antibiotic-resistant invasive pneumococcal disease by 62 percent from 2009 to 2013 among children under five years old. The study is the first report of the effectiveness of PCV13 to combat antibiotic-resistant infections, a vaccination recommended for children under five years old. Three-quarters of states require it for entry into daycare, and 85 percent of U.S. children have received the recommended four doses.

"We're at risk of living in a post-antibiotic world, where these miracle medications no longer work, but this vaccine is part of the solution to protecting ourselves from the growing threat of antibiotic resistance," said lead researcher Sara Tomczyk, PHN, MSc, epidemic intelligence service (EIS) officer for the Respiratory Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta. "Not only does this vaccine prevent pneumococcal infection, which means fewer antibiotics are prescribed, but it also prevents antibiotic-resistant infections."

The U.S. government's Healthy People 2020 initiative set a goal of reduction of antimicrobial-resistant invasive pneumococcal disease from 9.3 to 6 cases per 100,000 children. In the course of analyzing the data for this study, the team realized the goal had been met nine years early due to the effectiveness of the pneumococcal vaccine. Currently, the rate is 3.5 cases per 100,000 children.

PCV13 is given to children in four doses, at two, four, six and 12 through 15 months of age. The study collected data representing approximately 10 percent of the United States, which is considered illustrative of the country as a whole, said Tomczyk. PCV13 is effective against 13 strains of pneumococcal bacteria, while PCV7 was effective against seven. One dose of PCV13 also is now recommended for all adults 65 and older, followed by a dose of the pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine (PPSV23) six to 12 months later. Additionally, one dose of PCV13 is recommended for adults 19 and older with certain cancers, HIV and kidney failure, followed by doses of PPSV23.

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The above story is based on materials provided by Infectious Diseases Society of America . Note: Materials may be edited for content and length.

Potential of autochthonous bacteria for use as biofertilizers

Neiker-Tecnalia, the Basque Institute for Agricultural Research and Development, is working to select autochthonous bacteria with a biofertilizing potential as a result of the stimulating effect they have on the take-up of nutrients by plants, phytohormone production and phytopathogen control. The research is of great interest for farmers because bacteria-based biofertilizers constitute an alternative to conventional chemical fertilizers that are expensive and less sustainable from the environmental point of view.

The final goal in selecting autochthonous bacteria with a biofertilizing potential is to create a bacterial strain bank to be subsequently used in biofertilizing formulations. These bacteria have the capacity to increase the bioavailability of nutrients present in the soil so that the crops can thus assimilate them; what is more, they produce hormones that stimulate plant growth and encourage root development. Another of their advantages is that they even combat other micro-organisms in the soil that cause plant diseases.

Alternative to the adding of conventional fertilizers and pesticides

The aim of biofertilizers is to complement and, where appropriate, replace conventional chemical fertilizers so that their use can be reduced with the resulting economic and environmental benefits. In this respect, the bacteria used in biofertilizer formulations encourage plants to absorb, on their own, a greater quantity of nutrients which, even if they are naturally present in the soil, on occasions cannot be assimilated by plants because they are in an insoluble form. Conventional chemical fertilizers, however, supply the soil with chemical elements which, despite functioning as a fertilizer, can end up contaminating aquifers if they are not applied in the right dose and at the right moment.

By contrast, the bacteria containing biofertilizing formulations compete with other micro-organisms in the soil and can hamper the appearance of crop pests, thus minimizing the use of pesticides.

Neiker-Tecnalia researchers isolated autochthonous bacterial strains belonging to soil samples and plant tissue. They then selected the best candidates by means of in vitro analysis and right now they are running tests on lettuce crops (chosen for their rapid growth) in growth chambers under controlled conditions. One of the aims of this experiment is to test the capability of the bacteria with a biofertilizing potential and biofertilizers produced in an artisanal way by local farmers compared with commercial biofertilizers and conventional chemical fertilizers to increase productivity in poor soils and, specifically, to combat the impact of the Sclerotinia sclerotiorum pathogen which affects roots. In the experiment the effectiveness of other organic fertilizers like the bokashi type compost of Japanese origin will also be tested. The final step will be to test the effectiveness of the biofertilizers under actual field conditions.

The Neiker-Tecnalia research is opening up a channel of great interest to cut the use of chemically-synthesised fertilizers and pesticides that entail environmental hazards and constitute a significant economic cost for farmers.

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The above story is based on materials provided by Elhuyar Fundazioa . Note: Materials may be edited for content and length.

Urine of tiny migrating marine animals affects ocean chemistry

The largest migration on the planet is the movement of small animals from the surface of the open ocean, where they feed on plants under cover of darkness, to the sunless depths where they hide from predators during the day.

University of Washington researchers have found that this regular migration helps shape our oceans. During the daylight hours below the surface the animals release ammonia, the equivalent of our urine, that turns out to play a significant role in marine chemistry, particularly in low-oxygen zones. Results are published online this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

"I'm very fascinated by these massive migrations," said lead author Daniele Bianchi, a postdoctoral researcher in the UW School of Oceanography. "To me, it's exciting to think about the effects of animal behavior on a large scale in the ocean."

One might not think that peeing into the vastness of the oceans could have an effect. But the animals -- which include tiny zooplankton, crustaceans such as krill, and fish such as lanternfish up to a few inches long -- compensate for their small size with huge abundance throughout the world's oceans.

After a nighttime feast near the surface, these small creatures take a couple of hours to swim about 650 to 2,000 feet (200 to 600 meters) deep. Solid waste falls as pellets. The liquid waste is emitted more gradually.

In earlier work, Bianchi made the surprising finding that the animals spend most of their day in low-oxygen water. Marine bacteria consume oxygen as they decompose sinking dead material, creating low-oxygen zones a few hundred feet below the surface.

"The animals really seem to stop in low-oxygen regions, which is sort of puzzling," Bianchi said. Some speculated these zones might protect them from larger predators.

The earlier study also showed that animals actually contribute to these low-oxygen zones by using the little remaining oxygen to breathe.

Researchers next wondered about their other bodily functions.

For the new study, authors mined data from underwater sonar surveys to calculate how many animals are migrating to which depths, and where. Next they gauged the combined effect of their daytime digestion.

Results show that in certain parts of the ocean, ammonia released from animals drives a big part of the oxygen-free conversion of ammonium and other molecules to nitrogen gas, a key chemical transition.

"We still think bacteria do most of the job, but the effect of animals is enough to alter the rates of these reactions and maybe help explain some of the measurements," Bianchi said.

Inside low-oxygen zones, it's still mysterious how bacteria turn so much nitrogen-based ammonia into tight pairs of nitrogen atoms, like those found in air, which cannot be used by plants or animals. The conversion is important because it determines how much nitrogen-based fertilizer remains to support life in the world's oceans.

Researchers typically model low-oxygen zones using factors such as ocean currents, weather and bacterial growth. The new paper, Bianchi said, shows that diving animals, though more difficult to model, also play a role in marine chemistry.

The ocean's low-oxygen zones are projected to expand under climate change, as warmer waters hold less oxygen and decrease oxygen content below the surface. Understanding these zones is thus important for predicting what might happen to the oceans under climate change.

The research was funded by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, the Canadian Foundation for Innovation and the U.S. National Science Foundation. Co-authors are Andrew Babbin at Princeton University and Eric Galbraith at Canada's McGill University.

Story Source:

The above story is based on materials provided by University of Washington . The original article was written by Hannah Hickey. Note: Materials may be edited for content and length.

College athletes in contact sports more likely to carry MRSA, study finds

Even if they don't show signs of infection, college athletes who play football, soccer and other contact sports are more likely to carry the superbug methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), suggests a study on MRSA and athletes, which is being presented at IDWeek 2014™. This puts them at higher risk for infection and increases the likelihood of spreading the bug, which can cause serious and even fatal infections. The study is the first to observe college athletes who are not part of a larger MRSA outbreak.

Contact sport athletes were more than twice as likely as non-contact athletes to be colonized with MRSA, meaning they carried the bug on their bodies, usually in their noses and throats. Throughout the two-year study, colonization with MRSA ranged from 8 to 31 percent in contact sports athletes, compared to 0 to 23 percent of non-contact athletes. From 5 to 10 percent of the general population is colonized with MRSA.

"This study shows that even outside of a full scale outbreak, when athletes are healthy and there are no infections, there are still a substantial number of them who are colonized with these potentially harmful bacteria," said Natalia Jimenez-Truque, PhD, MSCI, research instructor, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, Tenn. "Sports teams can decrease the spread of MRSA by encouraging good hygiene in their athletes, including frequent hand washing and avoiding sharing towels and personal items such as soap and razors."

Researchers analyzed the time it took for college athletes to be colonized with Staphylococcus aureus (staph), including MRSA, the antibiotic-resistant variety, and how long they carried it. The study followed 377 male and female Vanderbilt University varsity athletes playing 14 different sports, incuding 224 who played contact sports such as football, soccer, basketball and lacrosse, comparing rates of colonization with staph to 153 who played non-contact sports, including baseball, cross country and golf. Each athlete had monthly nasal and throat swabs over the course of two academic years. The study also found contact athletes acquired MRSA more quickly and were colonized longer than non-contact athletes.

MRSA is a leading cause of skin and soft tissue infections, which often heal on their own or are easily treated. But the invasive form of MRSA can cause pneumonia and infections of the blood, heart, bone, joints and central nervous system, and kills about 18,000 people every year. Invasive MRSA is dificult to treat because standard antibiotic therapy may be ineffective, and physicians often must turn to powerful antibiotics delivered through an I.V.

Athletes in contact sports are at higher risk for getting colonized with or infected by MRSA because they have skin-to-skin contact and often have cuts and scrapes that allow the bug to enter the body.

Researchers said athletes can reduce the risk of spreading the bug by covering any open wounds, regularly washing their hands, showering after all practices and games, and not sharing razors and other personal equipment. Athletes with scratches and cuts should not practice or play in games, towels and clothes should be washed daily, and shared equipment and facilities should be cleaned routinely. While keeping equipment clean is important, researchers found little staph in the athletic environment, such as the locker room and weight room, suggesting that MRSA is most often spread person to person, Jimenez-Truque said.

"Staph is a problematic germ for us -- always has been, always will be -- and we need to do all we can to reduce the risk of infection in those at highest risk, such as college athletes," she said.

Story Source:

The above story is based on materials provided by Infectious Diseases Society of America . Note: Materials may be edited for content and length.

NSA May Have Undercover Operatives in Foreign Companies

An aerial view showing the ‘Dagger Complex’ in Griesheim near Darmstadt, Germany, 07 July 2014. The area on the edge of a former airfield is considered one of the most important branches of the US secret NSA. EPA/BORIS ROESSLER

As a much-anticipated documentary about NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden premiers in New York this evening, new revelations are being published simultaneously that expose more information about the NSA’s work to compromise computer networks and devices.

Newly-brought-to-light documents leaked by Snowden discuss operations by the NSA working inside China, Germany and South Korea to help physically subvert and compromise foreign networks and equipment, according to a report published by the Intercept. They also suggest the NSA may have undercover agents planted inside companies to provide assistance in gaining access to systems in the global communications industry. And they bolster previous reports that the NSA works with U.S. and foreign companies to weaken their encryption systems.

The new report is written by Peter Maass and Laura Poitras. Poitras is the celebrated documentary filmmaker who Snowden contacted in 2013 to provide her with a trove of NSA documents and who has interviewed him in Hong Kong and Moscow for her film CitizenFour.

Among the new documents, which are seen in the film, is a 13-page brief dating from 2004 about Sentry Eagle, a term the NSA used to describe a collection of closely held programs whose details were so tightly controlled that, according to the document, they could be disclosed only to a limited number of people approved by senior intelligence officials.

“Unauthorized disclosure . . .will cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security,” the document states. “The loss of this information could critically compromise highly sensitive cryptologic U.S. and foreign relationships, multi-year past and future NSA investments, and the ability to exploit foreign adversary cyberspace while protecting U.S. cyberspace.”

The brief reveals new details about six categories of NSA operations that fall under the Sentry Eagle rubric. These are also known as the NSA’s “core” secrets and are identified as:

Sentry Hawk—which involves computer network exploitation (aka CNE), the government’s term for digital espionage. (For example, programs like Flame would fall into this category.)

Sentry Falcon—which involves computer network defense.

Sentry Osprey—which appears to involve overseeing NSA clandestine operations conducted in conjunction with the CIA, FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency and Army intelligence. These operations involve human intelligence assets, or “HUMINT assets (Target Exploitation—TAREX) to support signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations.”

This is one of the biggest reveals of the report. Apparently, under Sentry Osprey, people responsible for target exploitation operations are embedded in operations conducted by the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and FBI to provide technical expertise these agencies lack. This would include covert or clandestine field activities as well as interception, or “interdiction” of devices in the supply chain to modify equipment or implant bugs or beacons in hardware. The TAREX group specializes in physical subversion—that is, subversion through physical access to a device or facility, rather than by implanting spyware remotely over the internet. The report doesn’t indicate if the kinds of modifications made to equipment involve sabotage, but it’s possible the alterations made could include planting logic bombs in software to destroy data or equipment, as Stuxnet did in Iran.

Some of the TAREX bases of operation overseas appear to be located in South Korea, Germany and Beijing, China. But domestic centers for these operations are also based in Hawaii, Texas and Georgia. The NSA also handily keeps TAREX personnel stationed at U.S. embassies.

Glenn Greenwald described this so-called interdiction activity in his recent book No Place to Hide, which included a photo of NSA agents opening packages that had been intercepted enroute to their destination in order to implant surveillance beacons in them.

Sentry Raven—focuses on cracking encryption systems. The documents state that the NSA “works with specific U.S. commercial entities…to modify U.S manufactured encryption systems to make them exploitable for SIGINT.” It doesn’t name the commercial entities or the encryption tools they modified, however.

Sentry Condor—involves computer network attacks (CNA), the government’s term for computer and network penetrations that involve degrading, damaging, delaying or destroying systems. (Think Stuxnet.)

Sentry Owl—a program involving collaboration with private companies.

Previous stories have revealed that the NSA has worked to convince U.S. companies to install backdoors and help the agency undermine encryption in their products to facilitate spying. They have also revealed how the NSA hacked computers belonging to system administrators at a telecom in Belgium to gain access to routers responsible for transmitting the mobile communications of customers. But none has discussed the NSA embedding agents in companies.

There has long been speculation about the NSA obtaining assistance from foreign companies. Most recently with regard to revelations that the NSA was intercepting all of the mobile phone communications of three countries—including Afghanistan.

Security experts have speculated that this type of collection would be difficult to accomplish without the cooperation of a telecom or the assistance of insiders to help the NSA subvert the telecom services. These documents indicate the speculation was right.

NSA May Have Undercover Operatives in Foreign Companies

An aerial view showing the ‘Dagger Complex’ in Griesheim near Darmstadt, Germany, 07 July 2014. The area on the edge of a former airfield is considered one of the most important branches of the US secret NSA. EPA/BORIS ROESSLER

As a much-anticipated documentary about NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden premiers in New York this evening, new revelations are being published simultaneously that expose more information about the NSA’s work to compromise computer networks and devices.

Newly-brought-to-light documents leaked by Snowden discuss operations by the NSA working inside China, Germany and South Korea to help physically subvert and compromise foreign networks and equipment, according to a report published by the Intercept. They also suggest the NSA may have undercover agents planted inside companies to provide assistance in gaining access to systems in the global communications industry. And they bolster previous reports that the NSA works with U.S. and foreign companies to weaken their encryption systems.

The new report is written by Peter Maass and Laura Poitras. Poitras is the celebrated documentary filmmaker who Snowden contacted in 2013 to provide her with a trove of NSA documents and who has interviewed him in Hong Kong and Moscow for her film CitizenFour.

Among the new documents, which are seen in the film, is a 13-page brief dating from 2004 about Sentry Eagle, a term the NSA used to describe a collection of closely held programs whose details were so tightly controlled that, according to the document, they could be disclosed only to a limited number of people approved by senior intelligence officials.

“Unauthorized disclosure . . .will cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security,” the document states. “The loss of this information could critically compromise highly sensitive cryptologic U.S. and foreign relationships, multi-year past and future NSA investments, and the ability to exploit foreign adversary cyberspace while protecting U.S. cyberspace.”

The documents describe new details about six NSA programs under the Sentry Eagle rubric. They are:

Sentry Hawk—which involves computer network exploitation (aka CNE), the government’s term for digital espionage. (For example, programs like Flame might fall in this category.)

Sentry Falcon—which involves computer network defense

Sentry Osprey—which appears to involve overseeing NSA clandestine operations conducted in conjunction with the CIA, FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency and Army intelligence. These operations involve human intelligence “HUMINT assets (Target Exploitation—TAREX) to support signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations.”

This is one of the biggest reveals of the report. Apparently, under Sentry Osprey, people responsible for target exploitation are embedded into operations conducted by the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and FBI to provide technical expertise these agencies lack. This would include covert or clandestine field activities or interception of devices in the supply chain to modify equipment or install hardware implants. The TAREX group specializes in physical subversion—that is, subversion involving physical access to a device or facility.

Some of the TAREX bases of operation overseas appear to be located in South Korea, Germany and Beijing, China. But domestic centers for these operations are also based in Hawaii, Texas and Georgia. The NSA also handily keeps TAREX personnel stationed in U.S. embassies.

Glen Greenwald described this so-called interdiction activity in his recent book No Place to Hide, which included a photo of NSA agents opening packages that had been intercepted enroute to their destination in order to implant surveillance beacons in them.

Sentry Raven—focuses on cracking encryption systems. The documents state that the NSA “works with specific U.S. commercial entities…to modify U.S manufactured encryption systems to make them exploitable for SIGINT.” It doesn’t name the commercial entities or the encryption tools they modified, however.

Sentry Condor—involves computer network attacks (CNA), the government’s term for computer and network penetrations that involve degrading, damaging, delaying or destroying systems. (Think Stuxnet.)

Sentry Owl—a program involving collaboration with private companies.

Previous stories have revealed that the NSA has worked to convince U.S. companies to install backdoors and help the agency undermine encryption in their products to facilitate spying. They have also revealed how the NSA hacked computers belonging to system administrators at a telecom in Belgium to gain access to routers responsible for transmitting the mobile communications of customers. But none has discussed the NSA embedding agents in companies.

There has long been speculation about the NSA obtaining assistance from foreign companies. Most recently with regard to revelations that the NSA was intercepting all of the mobile phone communications of three countries—including Afghanistan.

Security experts have speculated that this type of collection would be difficult to accomplish without the cooperation of a telecom or the assistance of insiders to help the NSA subvert the telecom services. These documents indicate the speculation was right.

It May Be the ‘Now’ Economy, But Is Main Street Retail Ready for iBeacon?

Julie Stapen for LightSpeed

The rise of technologies like the beacon, heat mapping and information kiosks have painted a high-tech picture for the future for retail. Major brands such as Lord and Taylor are already taking advantage of these technologies to create a unique in-store experience, send personalized marketing messages to customers, and design floor displays that maximize sales. These cool technologies are very Jetsons, and will certainly change how people experience retail. And retailers recognize this; a recent report from Business Insider indicates that beacon technologies are expected to see a five-year compound annual growth rate of 287 percent. But is this a reality for ALL retail, or just the megastores?

Much of the success and potential for real business impact with these advanced technologies is dependent on having your operations online, integrated and in real time. For instance, being able to stop discount notifications once an item is out of stock is essential. If not, your technology runs the risk of gaining the “annoying” label. Smaller retailers are already struggling to compete with the Amazons of the world, who are not only out-pricing them, but now making a more aggressive play for their customers. Some are still using old school cash registers, and post-it lists of inventory needs when a space appears on their shelves. Beacon technology is a solution to a problem that is not even on their radar yet.

In Silicon Valley and its various metropolitan cohorts, amenities like iPad checkouts and emailed receipts are more commonplace. The bulk of independent retailers, however, have a different reality. They are still experiencing major pain points like relying on the manual entry of customer information or lack of real-time updates on their inventory. A digitized, cross-channel retail management system has yet to become the standard, seriously limiting the number of retailers that can actually even use some of these flashy technologies properly without completely overhauling their management system. For independent retailers, that’s simply too much time and money that could be used toward other sales driving activities.

To really understand the appetite for such technologies, we decided to go straight to the source, surveying 650 independent retailers. The reality? For small to medium retailers, the survey found, the average tech budget is less than $200 per month. And they are putting their tech dollars first into things they say improve efficiency and immediately make an impact on their bottom line long before they invest in advanced technologies. So while a few big brands like Nordstrom have started tracking customer movements’ in-store, independent retailers, now more than ever, are focused on the technologies that are going to make an impact on their business today. But, although 79 to 89 percent of independent retailers we surveyed don’t plan to implement advanced in-store technologies like fitting room or geo-sensing capabilities in the next few years, they are looking toward the future. Based on our survey, here are our forecasts for where “Main Street” retail will be investing in the near term:

In-Store Mobile Device Explosion

The percent of retailers using tablets, smartphones and other mobile devices in-store is expected to double by the end of 2014. For those that are already using mobile for checkout or inventory lookup, 80 percent say that it has increased sales.

Predictive Analytics

Forty-four percent of retailers said finding the right inventory levels was their biggest challenge—more than any other business obstacle. Twenty three percent of merchants surveyed said they currently use predictive analytics to help make more informed buying and selling decisions, and the effect of this data is powerful; 96 percent of those respondents using predictive analytics said it has helped increase sales. Another 48 percent plan to implement predictive analytics in the near future, a 108 percent increase from the current.

Moving Online

E-commerce will continue to attract budget as retailers look to add another channel through which to engage their customers. While less than half — 38 percent — of those surveyed, currently have an online storefront, merchants are planning on investing in ecommerce. Our survey found that 38 percent without an e- commerce presence say they will open one either by the end of the year or the near future — a 100 percent increase. Those that already have an online store see its value and will invest to make it more robust. Fifty eight percent plan to increase budget for their online store in the next 12 months.

There is a huge technology trend in catering to the “now” economy. If consumers want their house clean, they can order a housekeeper with the click of a button. Want an Amazon Fire? No problem, a drone will fly it to you. In the case of the beacon, mobile is a huge opportunity to connect directly with consumers while merging the online and offline retail worlds, and there are some incredible technologies that can truly create the store of the future. Some big brands are already there. But there is a lot of work to be done before “Main Street” retail is ready.

Dax Dasilva is the founder, CEO and creative mind behind LightSpeed.

It May Be the ‘Now’ Economy, But Is Main Street Retail Ready for iBeacon?

Julie Stapen for LightSpeed

The rise of technologies like the beacon, heat mapping and information kiosks have painted a high-tech picture for the future for retail. Major brands such as Lord and Taylor are already taking advantage of these technologies to create a unique in-store experience, send personalized marketing messages to customers, and design floor displays that maximize sales. These cool technologies are very Jetsons, and will certainly change how people experience retail. And retailers recognize this; a recent report from Business Insider indicates that beacon technologies are expected to see a five-year compound annual growth rate of 287 percent. But is this a reality for ALL retail, or just the megastores?

Much of the success and potential for real business impact with these advanced technologies is dependent on having your operations online, integrated and in real time. For instance, being able to stop discount notifications once an item is out of stock is essential. If not, your technology runs the risk of gaining the “annoying” label. Smaller retailers are already struggling to compete with the Amazons of the world, who are not only out-pricing them, but now making a more aggressive play for their customers. Some are still using old school cash registers, and post-it lists of inventory needs when a space appears on their shelves. Beacon technology is a solution to a problem that is not even on their radar yet.

In Silicon Valley and its various metropolitan cohorts, amenities like iPad checkouts and emailed receipts are more commonplace. The bulk of independent retailers, however, have a different reality. They are still experiencing major pain points like relying on the manual entry of customer information or lack of real-time updates on their inventory. A digitized, cross-channel retail management system has yet to become the standard, seriously limiting the number of retailers that can actually even use some of these flashy technologies properly without completely overhauling their management system. For independent retailers, that’s simply too much time and money that could be used toward other sales driving activities.

To really understand the appetite for such technologies, we decided to go straight to the source, surveying 650 independent retailers. The reality? For small to medium retailers, the survey found, the average tech budget is less than $200 per month. And they are putting their tech dollars first into things they say improve efficiency and immediately make an impact on their bottom line long before they invest in advanced technologies. So while a few big brands like Nordstrom have started tracking customer movements’ in-store, independent retailers, now more than ever, are focused on the technologies that are going to make an impact on their business today. But, although 79 to 89 percent of independent retailers we surveyed don’t plan to implement advanced in-store technologies like fitting room or geo-sensing capabilities in the next few years, they are looking toward the future. Based on our survey, here are our forecasts for where “Main Street” retail will be investing in the near term:

In-Store Mobile Device Explosion

The percent of retailers using tablets, smartphones and other mobile devices in-store is expected to double by the end of 2014. For those that are already using mobile for checkout or inventory lookup, 80 percent say that it has increased sales.

Predictive Analytics

Forty-four percent of retailers said finding the right inventory levels was their biggest challenge—more than any other business obstacle. Twenty three percent of merchants surveyed said they currently use predictive analytics to help make more informed buying and selling decisions, and the effect of this data is powerful; 96 percent of those respondents using predictive analytics said it has helped increase sales. Another 48 percent plan to implement predictive analytics in the near future, a 108 percent increase from the current.

Moving Online

E-commerce will continue to attract budget as retailers look to add another channel through which to engage their customers. While less than half — 38 percent — of those surveyed, currently have an online storefront, merchants are planning on investing in ecommerce. Our survey found that 38 percent without an e- commerce presence say they will open one either by the end of the year or the near future — a 100 percent increase. Those that already have an online store see its value and will invest to make it more robust. Fifty eight percent plan to increase budget for their online store in the next 12 months.

There is a huge technology trend in catering to the “now” economy. If consumers want their house clean, they can order a housekeeper with the click of a button. Want an Amazon Fire? No problem, a drone will fly it to you. In the case of the beacon, mobile is a huge opportunity to connect directly with consumers while merging the online and offline retail worlds, and there are some incredible technologies that can truly create the store of the future. Some big brands are already there. But there is a lot of work to be done before “Main Street” retail is ready.

Dax Dasilva is the founder, CEO and creative mind behind LightSpeed.

Judge Rejects Defense That FBI Illegally Hacked Silk Road—On a Technicality

This artist rendering shows Ross William Ulbricht, second from left, appearing in Federal Court with his public defender Brandon LeBlanc, left, in San Francisco on Friday, Oct. 4, 2013. U.S. Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero, right, has postponed the bail hearing for Ulbricht who is being charged as the mastermind of Silk Road, an encrypted website where users could shop for drugs like heroin and LSD anonymously. Vicki Behringer / AP

Lawyers for Ross Ulbricht have spent the last two months shifting the focus from their client, charged with creating the billion-dollar drug market the Silk Road, and putting it onto the potential illegality of the FBI’s investigation. Now the judge in that case has spoken, and it’s clear she intends to put Ulbricht on trial, not the FBI.

In a 38-page ruling Friday, Judge Katherine Forrest dismissed the defense’s motion to suppress evidence that hinged on the argument that law enforcement had violated Ulbricht’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy from unreasonable searches. Just last week, Ulbricht’s lawyers went so far as to contend that the FBI had illegally hacked a Silk Road server in Iceland without a warrant to determine its location.

But the Judge’s rejection of that argument comes down to what may be seen as a fateful technicality: she argues that even if the FBI did hack the Silk Road server, Ulbricht hadn’t sufficiently demonstrated that the server belonged to him, and thus can’t claim that his privacy rights were violated by its search. “Defendant has…brought what he must certainly understand is a fatally deficient motion to suppress [evidence],” the judge writes. “He has failed to take the one step he needed to take to allow the Court to consider his substantive claims regarding the investigation: he has failed to submit anything establishing that he has a personal privacy interest in the Icelandic server or any of the other items imaged and/or searched and/or seized.”

That argument may seem like a Catch-22. If Ulbricht were to claim ownership of that server he would seem to incriminate himself. But Forrest writes that Ulbricht could have nonetheless claimed the server in a pre-trial statement that couldn’t be used against him as evidence. “Defendant could have established such a personal privacy interest by submitting a sworn statement that could not be offered against him at trial as evidence of his guilt (though it could be used to impeach him should he take the witness stand),” she writes. “Yet he has chosen not to do so.”

Ulbricht’s defense lawyers didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Forrest’s decision follows a lengthy pre-trial debate that came to center around the mysterious events that led the FBI to Ulbricht’s alleged Icelandic server. In early August, Ulbricht’s defense lawyers filed a motion to suppress all the evidence in Ulbricht’s case that they argued had resulted from the potentially illegal search of the computer Ulbricht allegedly rented in a Reykjavik data center to host the Silk Road. If successful, the move would have likely made Ulbricht nearly impossible to convict on the central charges of narcotics and money-laundering conspiracy that he faces.

The prosecution, however, responded with an affidavit from the FBI that described how it found the Silk Road server. According to the bureau, an agent simply entered “miscellaneous characters” into its login screen until a misconfiguration in the anonymity software Tor leaked the site’s IP address.

If successful, the move would have likely made Ulbricht nearly impossible to convict.

In this Oct. 4, 2013 file photo, an artist rendering showing Ross William Ulbricht during an appearance at Federal Court in San Francisco is shown. Authorities say that Ulbricht had spent most of three years “evading law enforcement, living a double life” while operating an underground website known as Silk Road, a black-market bazaar for cocaine, heroin and other drugs, while portraying himself as an Internet trailblazer. On Thursday, Nov. 21, 2013, a federal judge ordered Ulbricht held without bail during a court appearance in New York. Vicki Behringer / AP

The security community and an expert witness for Ulbricht’s defense quickly began to find major inconsistencies in that story. They argued instead that the FBI’s account sounded like a thinly-veiled intrusion using common hacker techniques. The defense called for a hearing to cross examine the FBI.

But the prosecution’s final response to that argument barely addressed its hacking accusations. Instead, the Justice Department lawyers told the judge that it didn’t matter whether the Silk Road was hacked. Even if FBI agents had remotely broken into the Silk Road without a warrant, that would be perfectly legal, according to the government filing. They pointed to the foreign location of the server and its ownership by a third party web hosting.

Several of those arguments had serious weaknesses, Stanford Law professor Jennifer Granick told WIRED Monday. The FBI’s ability to hack any website abroad without a warrant has never been established in court. Because the Silk Road ran on the Tor anonymity software, the FBI couldn’t have even known who hosted the server or where before it performed its intrusive search.

In its final jab at the prosecution, the defense had argued that the Department of Justice was trying to excuse a kind of warrantless hacking that would be considered illegal in any other context. “The government posits two standards of behavior: one for private citizens, who must adhere to a strict standard of conduct construed by the government,” read a final filing Tuesday. “The other for the government, which, with its elastic ability to effect electronic intrusion, can deliberately, cavalierly, and unrepentantly transgress those same standards.”

But in Friday’s ruling, that entire discussion has been declared moot. Because Ulbricht hasn’t sufficiently claimed that the computer belonged to him, Judge Forrest writes that any arguments over the FBI’s pinpointing of that server—whether through hacking or more accepted search techniques—can’t be seen as a privacy violation. “In short, despite defendant’s assertions and the potential issues he and his counsel raise regarding the investigation that led to the Icelandic server,” she writes, “he has not provided the Court with the minimal legal basis necessary to pursue these assertions.”

The FBI’s ability to hack any website abroad without a warrant has never been established in court.

Forrest’s ruling comes as a blow not only to Ulbricht, but also to others in the privacy community for whom the defense’s motions could have set important precedents. After all, the prosecution in the case had argued that the FBI can—more or less—legally hack any website in the world without a warrant.

“Overseas searches that target Americans still have to be reasonable,” Stanford Law’s Granick told WIRED earlier this week. “If the target is a US person and it’s a US agent looking for information, the Fourth Amendment still applies.”

That argument, and the other questions surrounding the FBI’s murking investigation, at least merited a hearing, she argued. “I do think that the defendant has alleged sufficiently that his communications flowing over this system are protected by the Fourth Amendment, such that the government should have to explain why their investigation didn’t cross that line.”

Now that hearing will never happen. Instead, the next time the public will learn more about the FBI’s Silk Road investigation will likely be next month, at Ulbricht’s trial.

Forrest Ruling 2

Judge Rejects Defense That FBI Illegally Hacked Silk Road—On a Technicality

Vicki Behringer / AP

Lawyers for Ross Ulbricht have spent the last two months shifting the focus from their client, charged with creating the billion-dollar drug market the Silk Road, and putting it onto the potential illegality of the FBI’s investigation. Now the judge in that case has spoken, and it’s clear she intends to put Ulbricht on trial, not the FBI.

In a 38-page ruling Friday, Judge Katherine Forrest dismissed the defense’s motion to suppress evidence that hinged on the argument that law enforcement had violated Ulbricht’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy from unreasonable searches. Just last week, Ulbricht’s lawyers went so far as to contend that the FBI had illegally hacked a Silk Road server in Iceland without a warrant to determine its location.

But the Judge’s rejection of that argument comes down to what may be seen as a fateful technicality: she argues that even if the FBI did hack the Silk Road server, Ulbricht hadn’t sufficiently demonstrated that the server belonged to him, and thus can’t claim that his privacy rights were violated by its search. “Defendant has…brought what he must certainly understand is a fatally deficient motion to suppress [evidence],” the judge writes. “He has failed to take the one step he needed to take to allow the Court to consider his substantive claims regarding the investigation: he has failed to submit anything establishing that he has a personal privacy interest in the Icelandic server or any of the other items imaged and/or searched and/or seized.”

That argument may seem like a Catch-22. If Ulbricht were to claim ownership of that server he would seem to incriminate himself. But Forrest writes that Ulbricht could have nonetheless claimed the server in a pre-trial statement that couldn’t be used against him as evidence. “Defendant could have established such a personal privacy interest by submitting a sworn statement that could not be offered against him at trial as evidence of his guilt (though it could be used to impeach him should he take the witness stand),” she writes. “Yet he has chosen not to do so.”

Ulbricht’s defense lawyers didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Forrest’s decision follows a lengthy pre-trial debate that came to center around the mysterious events that led the FBI to Ulbricht’s alleged Icelandic server. In early August, Ulbricht’s defense lawyers filed a motion to suppress all the evidence in Ulbricht’s case that they argued had resulted from the potentially illegal search of the computer Ulbricht allegedly rented in a Reykjavik data center to host the Silk Road. If successful, the move would have likely made Ulbricht nearly impossible to convict on the central charges of narcotics and money-laundering conspiracy that he faces.

The prosecution, however, responded with an affidavit from the FBI that described how it found the Silk Road server. According to the bureau, an agent simply entered “miscellaneous characters” into its login screen until a misconfiguration in the anonymity software Tor leaked the site’s IP address.

If successful, the move would have likely made Ulbricht nearly impossible to convict.

The security community and an expert witness for Ulbricht’s defense quickly began to find major inconsistencies in that story. They argued instead that the FBI’s account sounded like a thinly-veiled intrusion using common hacker techniques. The defense called for a hearing to cross examine the FBI.

But the prosecution’s final response to that argument barely addressed its hacking accusations. Instead, the Justice Department lawyers told the judge that it didn’t matter whether the Silk Road was hacked. Even if FBI agents had remotely broken into the Silk Road without a warrant, that would be perfectly legal, according to the government filing. They pointed to the foreign location of the server and its ownership by a third party web hosting.

Several of those arguments had serious weaknesses, Stanford Law professor Jennifer Granick told WIRED Monday. The FBI’s ability to hack any website abroad without a warrant has never been established in court. Because the Silk Road ran on the Tor anonymity software, the FBI couldn’t have even known who hosted the server or where before it performed its intrusive search.

In its final jab at the prosecution, the defense had argued that the Department of Justice was trying to excuse a kind of warrantless hacking that would be considered illegal in any other context. “The government posits two standards of behavior: one for private citizens, who must adhere to a strict standard of conduct construed by the government,” read a final filing Tuesday. “The other for the government, which, with its elastic ability to effect electronic intrusion, can deliberately, cavalierly, and unrepentantly transgress those same standards.”

But in Friday’s ruling, that entire discussion has been declared moot. Because Ulbricht hasn’t sufficiently claimed that the computer belonged to him, Judge Forrest writes that any arguments over the FBI’s pinpointing of that server—whether through hacking or more accepted search techniques—can’t be seen as a privacy violation. “In short, despite defendant’s assertions and the potential issues he and his counsel raise regarding the investigation that led to the Icelandic server,” she writes, “he has not provided the Court with the minimal legal basis necessary to pursue these assertions.”

The FBI’s ability to hack any website abroad without a warrant has never been established in court.

Forrest’s ruling comes as a blow not only to Ulbricht, but also to others in the privacy community for whom the defense’s motions could have set important precedents. After all, the prosecution in the case had argued that the FBI can—more or less—legally hack any website in the world without a warrant.

“Overseas searches that target Americans still have to be reasonable,” Stanford Law’s Granick told WIRED earlier this week. “If the target is a US person and it’s a US agent looking for information, the Fourth Amendment still applies.”

That argument, and the other questions surrounding the FBI’s murking investigation, at least merited a hearing, she argued. “I do think that the defendant has alleged sufficiently that his communications flowing over this system are protected by the Fourth Amendment, such that the government should have to explain why their investigation didn’t cross that line.”

Now that hearing will never happen. Instead, the next time the public will learn more about the FBI’s Silk Road investigation will likely be next month, at Ulbricht’s trial.

Forrest Ruling 2